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The Promise and Limits of Lawfulness: Inequality, Law, and the Techlash
Salomé Viljoen*
Abstract: In response to widespread skepticism about the recent rise of “tech ethics”, many critics have called
for legal reform instead. In contrast with the “ethics response”, critics consider the “lawfulness response” more
capable of disciplining the excesses of the technology industry. In fact, both are simultaneously vulnerable to
industry capture and capable of advancing a more democratic egalitarian agenda for the information economy.
Both ethics and law offer a terrain of contestation, rather than a predetermined set of commitments by which
to achieve more democratic and egalitarian technological production. In advancing this argument, the essay
focuses on two misunderstandings common among proponents of the lawfulness response. First, they
misdiagnose the harms of the techlash as arising from law’s absence. In fact, law mediates the institutions that
it enacts, the productive activities it encases, and the modes and myths of production it upholds and legitimates.
Second, this distinction between law’s absence and presence implies that once law’s presence is secured, the
problems of the techlash will be addressed. This concedes the legitimacy of the very regimes currently at issue
in law’s own legitimacy crisis, and those that have presided over the techlash. The twin moment of reckoning
in tech and law thus poses a challenge to those looking to address discontent with technology with promises
of future lawfulness.
Key words: law; technology; ethics; tech ethics; inequality; regulation

“Laws have to determine what is legal, but you can not
ban technology. Sure, that might lead to a dystopian
future or something, but you can not ban it.”
−David Scalzo, Kirenaga Partners[1]
“Ferment is abroad in the law.”
−K. N. Llewellyn[2]

1

The Techlash

In the past several years, the prevailing role of Silicon
Valley’s California Ideology as the source of hope and
inspiration for the “Western capitalist imaginary” has
begun to falter[3]. No longer does the tech industry stand
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for the propositions of inclusive capitalism and
technological progress that benefit all. In the wake of
Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal the
technology industry has been the focus of increased
public distrust, civil and worker activism, and regulatory
scrutiny—a collective curdling of goodwill referred to
as the “techlash”.①
The techlash is remarkable for its depth of field. The
2020 Edelman Trust Barometer noted a continued
decline in trust both globally and in the U.S. in
technology and a significant distrust of artificial
intelligence[4], both linked to increased numbers of
people who believe these sectors should be regulated.
A 2019 study conducted by the Pew Research Center
① The techlash —and the inequality it is a response to—is a global
phenomenon. However, this piece will predominantly draw its examples
and focus its analysis on the United States. This is in part a reflection of
the author’s expertise as a US legal scholar (law is a jurisdiction-specific
discipline; particularly in the United States). But it is also due to the
Essay’s extensive engagement with—and analytical reliance on—the
particularities of the U.S. common law judicial system. The role of courts
in the U.S. system, as well as the specific legal intellectual tradition in and
about U.S. law, informs, constrains, and limits much of the discussion
below.
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found that from 2015 to 2019, the number of Americans
who held a positive view of technology fell by 21
percentage points[5]. In 2018, a majority of Americans
(55%) said tech companies have too much power and
influence[5]. Former executives have spoken out against
their company’s actions[6–8], and senior engineers and
civil society groups have called for moratoriums or
outright bans on facial recognition technology,
especially for police and immigration enforcement[9].
Student groups at universities have protested or banned
companies like Palantir recruiting at their schools[10].
Community groups have pushed to dismantle and
delegitimize the close ties between law enforcement and
surveillance technology companies[11]. The technology
industry has been the site of increased worker activism
from Amazon warehouses workers[12], Uber and Lyft
drivers[13], line engineers at Google[14], and the tech
industry writ large[15, 16]. Digital rights’ activists have
pressured companies about their policies and labor
practices on everything ranging from content
moderation, polarization, lack of diversity, surveillance,
and manipulative and extractive data collection practices.
Alongside the popular backlash, technology’s harmful
social effects have become the subject of increased
academic inquiry. Scholars seek to diagnose and address
the worst excesses of industry harm, and to develop
technical methods and fields of practice less conducive
to committing them. These methods produce systems
that are normatively relevant to the areas of life they
govern: they can amplify and reproduce inequality and
entrench unjust means of social ordering. Scholars of
scientific method (science and techonlongy studies,
history of science, philosophy of science, and critical
digital studies), as well as computer scientists have
highlighted methodological limits in how algorithms are
developed and the need for interventions better attuned
to the social causes and effects in which such systems are
entangled[17]. Increased attention to engineering
pedagogy has placed renewed attention on need to
educate future data scientists and engineers about the
ethical and social dimensions of their work[18].
The techlash involves significant political stakes.
Growing worker activism and agitation at companies
like Google and Amazon have led to these companies
firing senior engineers[19]. Oppressive and biased
technologies such as facial recognition and the capacity
of social media to manufacture dis- and misinformation
campaigns are being used by authoritarian regimes
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abroad and reactionaries at home[20, 21]. Companies like
AirBnB and Uber erode workers’ rights and redistribute
significant surplus wealth away from local renters and
workers[22, 23]. The dominance of a handful of large
technology companies (Facebook, Amazon, Apple,
Microsoft, and Google) is spurring renewed debates over
market concentration and monopoly. The pervasive data
collection, processing, and analytic practices that
undergird controversial technologies continue to erode
our collective privacy (and contribute to the oppressive
power of autonomous surveillance systems) amidst an
industry-wide gold rush for data[24].
Digital activism is not new—in the United States,
groups like the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the
American Civil Liberties Union have long advocated for
civil rights protections online. Yet these organizations
have traditionally focused on civil libertarian concerns
over privacy, strong free speech protections, and
government overreach. As a result, their advocacy
efforts focused on issues like the Edward Snowden
revelations over extensive US security surveillance
programs, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. In
each instance, digital advocates defended free speech
(and the absence of government surveillance necessary
for free speech to thrive) of users and content creators
online. This strain of digital advocacy emphasized
protecting individuals’ online freedom but did not
typically focus on other forms of injustice, such as the
wealth accumulation that motivated corporate
advertising-based surveillance practices or on the
distributive or relational effects of the digital economy
writ large. In short, while there is a long history of
concern over surveillance online, this tradition of digital
activism did not historically focus on the social problems
of inequality that arise because of surveillance-based
economic activity.
The techlash, on the other hand, evinces marked
egalitarian concerns over the highly unequal
distributions of wealth and power within the digital
economy. It expresses a rejection of the tech industry’s
justificatory narrative for the inequality it generates: that
technological progress on its terms will, in the long-run,
benefit everyone. There is growing skepticism over
technological advancement as a project of shared
prosperity and a growing understanding of the
technology political economy as one that works to the
benefit of the few to the detriment of the many[5, 25].
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Critics of digital technology firms argue that their
technological progress relies upon extractive practices
and oppressive purposes. This begs the question of how
to achieve an alternative result, and what role (if any)
“tech ethics” will play in achieving it.

2

Ethics Response and Lawfulness Response:
Troubling the Distinction

In the ensuing public debate, some have advocated for
tech to become more “human”, and more “ethical”[18].
Others suspect that appeals to traditions of ethics and
humanism have less to do with the moral lessons such
traditions offer, and more to do with their rhetorical and
public-relations capacity to forestall legal and regulatory
action[26–32]. Such debates set off second order debates
over whether appeals to “ethics” negate rather than
require regulatory action[33, 34]. These in turn spawn
tertiary debates over what such appeals substantively or
materially entail, under what conditions appeals become
demands, and who gets to decide what ethical practice
means for the technology industry[18, 35, 36].
This initial emphasis on “responsible”, “humane”,
“human-centered”, or “ethical” technology and the
resulting set of discursive moves are all part of what I call
the ethics response. The ethics response has real power
to marshal bureaucratic and material resources. The call
for more ethical technology has spawned a series of
ethics boards, company-funded corporate wellness and
social responsibility initiatives, the rise of “ethical AI”
consultancy practices, and a flurry of publications that
outline ethical AI principles for industry[18, 37, 38]. This
response has received much attention and been the
subject of considerable debate.
Alongside an increased emphasis on ethics, a riskaverse, law-abiding modus operandi pervades the Csuites of Silicon Valley that recalls a certain attitude
among banks post-2008 crisis: a patina of cowed mea
culpa alongside assurances that lessons have been
learned. This second response is marked by an initial
commitment from executives that the era of “move fast
and break things” is over, and that the strictest
interpretation of legal protections will be followed. Like
the ethics response, this legalistic mode coalesces from
a particular set of discursive moves. Critics call for legal
investigations, lawsuits, or new regulation. Companies
seek to comply with these calls or proactively offer
alternatives as simultaneous signal of compromise and
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seriousness. Like the ethics response, this response can
marshal resources for meaningful new regulatory
agendas. Companies change corporate governance and
business practices[39, 40], embrace regulatory agendas
they had previously fought[41, 42], and even join activist
calls for increased oversight and regulation[43, 44]. This
attitude marks another strain of response to the techlash
that I call the lawfulness response.
The lawfulness response is often positioned in contrast
to the ethics response as a more serious alternative[31–33].
While critics view the ethics response as ineffectual (or
even a harmful distraction), the lawfulness response is
often advanced as more capable of disciplining the
excesses of the technology industry: “we do not need
ethics, we need regulation.” And indeed, the lawfulness
response
generally
accompanies
companies’
acquiescence to a more significant regulatory agenda.
Depending on how such demands were articulated and
then negotiated by industry actors, the lawfulness
response may result in private regulation—a change in
corporate governance or firm policy, often in response to
threatened or actual litigation—or legislative action,
with companies joining advocates in calling for industry
regulation. Where the ethics response is viewed as either
too vague or too readily co-opted to provide a
meaningful form of discipline, the lawfulness response
appears to offer a more robust vehicle for realizing the
social demands of the techlash.
Despite this perception, the ethics and lawfulness
responses function quite similarly. Like the ethics
response, the lawfulness response may also yield antiegalitarian results. Cynical actors may appeal to law to
seek moral cover for instituting (and then complying
with) with a low standard of behavior. But well-meaning
critics may also appeal to legal solutions that
inadvertently legitimize the very business practices they
seek to reform. Similar to the ethics response, the
capacity for the lawfulness response to discipline the
technology industry depends on its capacity to express
and enforce egalitarian demands.
Two examples of the lawfulness response are
instructive.
The first involves Uber. In its early rise to prominence,
Uber gained considerable notoriety and begrudging
admiration for operating at the edge of legality in pursuit
of rapid and aggressive growth[45, 46]. In 2017, this
strategy appeared finally to be catching up with Uber. In
that year alone, Uber faced a federal criminal
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investigation into its Project Greyball② became
embroiled in a legal fight with Waymo over its alleged
theft of self-driving car technology, and was
experiencing growing backlash from drivers over low
pay and poor working conditions[47–49]. In addition, the
company was embroiled in allegations of sexual
harassment and a toxic work culture for women and
minorities[50]. Many commentators thought this
collection of scandals marked the end of the company—
a fate that longstanding critics of Uber welcomed.
Focusing on the workplace culture allegations, the
company’s board of directors promptly hired former
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder (then at Covington
& Burling) to conduct an internal investigation and issue
a report, a high-profile step that was extensively covered
in the media. The report resulted in the board adopting
a series of corporate governance practices and ultimately
firing then-CEO Travis Kalanick. This change in
leadership and attendant set of institutional changes
were generally understood to end the company’s “wild
west days” and to usher in a new era of a law-abiding
Uber focused on “ensur[ing] a tone of support and a
culture of compliance”[40, 51]. In line with this new
culture, Uber dropped many of its more openly
aggressive tactics, such as Project Greyball.
Uber’s lawfulness response was an impressive display
of threading the needle: it addressed the public attitude
of Uber (as a deviant and morally suspect company) by
signaling legal seriousness, while keeping intact a
business model that was also a primary subject of
critique[51]. Focusing its response on workplace culture
allegations at its headquarters, Uber drew fire away from
its continued use of pricing manipulations and other
techniques to squeeze profit from drivers.
A second, more proactive example of the lawfulness
response is Microsoft’s approach to developing facial
recognition technology. As questionable business
practices of facial recognition companies have come to
light[1], the social pressure to ban[52] or place a
moratorium[53] on facial recognition technologies has
② Beginning around 2014, Uber used a program called Greyball. It
operated this scheme in cities like Boston, Paris, Portland, and countries
like Australia and China—all places Uber had been restricted or banned—
to evade detection by using geo-fencing around government buildings
and “greyballing” users identified as law enforcement or city officials[47].
While approved by Uber’s general counsel at the time, other legal experts
thought the program may constitute a violation of the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act or an act of intentional obstruction of justice, and a federal
criminal investigation into the company’s misleading tactics with local
regulators soon followed.
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grown—even Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai has
suggested a temporary moratorium on facial recognition
technologies may be needed[43].
Microsoft has called for legalistic restraint as one way
to temper concerns while continuing development. The
company is publicly refusing to sell their technology to
California police (citing Fourth Amendment concerns),
endorsing federal regulation, such as the Commercial
Facial Recognition Privacy Act, and introducing its six
principles for facial recognition software that include
“lawful surveillance” and prohibitions against use for
“unlawful discrimination”[54]. This middle path appeals
to the restraint of law to narrow public critique of facial
recognition to its most egregious (and, it is proposed,
unlawful) applications, while preserving other areas of
application intact. Microsoft’s chief legal officer Brad
Smith likened a wholesale ban to “try[ing] to solve a
problem with a meat cleaver” when a “scalpel” is
required to “enable good things to get done and bad
things to stop happening”[9]. The lawfulness response
provides precisely such a scalpel-like approach: a
cautious-yet-optimistic
program
of
continued
development of facial recognition technology under the
guiderails of existing law. As Smith notes, “This is
young technology. It will get better. But the only way to
make it better is actually to continue developing it. And
the only way to continue developing it actually is to have
more people using it”[9].
As these two examples show, the turn to lawfulness
during moments of popular backlash serves an important
role for companies. In the case of Uber, bringing in a
high-profile legal investigator like Eric Holder—the
embodiment of a trusted form of lawful authority, the
Obama Justice Department—shifted perception of the
company from lawless adolescence to reformed and
responsible corporate adulthood, while preserving its
core business model. In the case of Microsoft, faced with
a far more aggressive regulatory alternative in the form
of bans or moratoriums, the company emphasized the
importance of continued, yet responsible, development
of the technology. This tack grants Microsoft the ability
to craft through law a basis for its own legitimacy: by
proceeding with its business under the imprimatur of law,
the company may reap the financial benefits of the
technology without suffering reputational harm. In both
examples, the lawfulness response is marshaled to chart
a middle path, softening calls for abolition—of an entire
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business model or a technology—into steps for
continuation, just in a more procedurally robust and
accountable manner.
The lawfulness response offers companies a pathway
to regain or retain legitimacy for their business in the face
of accusations of injustice. It does so in part by
collapsing the distinction between lawfulness and
legitimacy in the company’s actions. This separates out
unlawful/illegitimate actions from lawful/legitimate
ones—an important separation that distances those
practices that are of central importance to a company’s
business from those that are not. By dealing seriously
with the unlawful/illegitimate practices, the category
distinction between these practices and the rest of the
business is reinforced. This reinforced separation has
significant material stakes. In the case of Uber, the
lawfulness response undergirds an all-important
distinction for the company: that sexual harassment at
work is illegal, whereas harsh contracting terms for
independent contractors are not. In the case of Microsoft,
this distinction is proactive—a campaign to
disambiguate the illegitimate/unlawful uses of facial
recognition (backroom deals with law enforcement,
warrantless searches), from the legitimate/lawful ones
(a category the company argues requires further
exploration). The unlawful actions thus identified and
addressed, the company’s remaining actions regain or
retain legitimacy.

3

Lawfulness As Anti-Regulatory

Lending credence to the lawfulness response is that a
corollary version of it—what I call the legalist-reform
response—is accepted and even championed among
some of big tech’s fiercest critics. When such critics
emphasize the lawlessness of company actions, it sets up
technology companies to reply credibly to popular
frustrations with the lawfulness response.
The legalist-reform response suffers from two
limitations as a strategy for democratic egalitarian
reform. First, it misdiagnoses the role of law in current
processes of technological production as one of absence.
Second, and more importantly, by invoking an absence
of law or a failure to comply with existing law, such
responses concede the status of such law as capable of
expressing the particular demands of justice in the
techlash. Such responses thus concede the legitimacy of
lawfulness responses without specifying the substantive
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and normative commitments such an intervention should
aim to secure and upon which legitimacy would seem to
be contingent. Legalist-reform responses may thus
articulate a claim that “compliance” or “regulation” is
needed, but do not, in and of themselves, provide
substantive or conceptual specificity regarding what
such law should achieve or enact in order to be
satisfactory.
Both limitations combine to make this form of critique
conceptually vulnerable to anti-egalitarian agendas.
Critics advancing legalist-reform agendas risk
misdiagnosing the role of law and conceding the
legitimacy of law. This then allows companies to defend
exploitative business models as lawful and therefore
legitimate, particularly by applying the “scalpel” of legal
intervention to separate and excise the worst instances
of abuse while preserving the core business practices that
give rise to them. Both invoke a popular imagination of
the role of law that is quite distinct from the role that law
in fact plays.
3.1

Law as absent, law as present

Some of big tech’s fiercest critics propose legalistreform solutions. For example, Zuboff[55] reserves a key
role for data protection and greater transparency in
averting the disasters of surveillance capitalism. Her
critique focuses on the lawless and un-governed “dark
data continent of… inner life” that, absent any regulatory
protection against plunder, is “summoned into the light
for others’ profit”. She cites the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) as a significant positive force that
may help make “the life of the law … move against
surveillance capitalism”. In her account, such laws
provide a way to turn the interrogatory spotlight back
onto tech companies. Others have similarly advocated
the need for applying existing law, particularly
fundamental rights protections, as “able, agile, and
flexible”[56] when used against technology companies to
“shape, apply, and enforce” data rights[57].
The enormity of injustice catalogued by these critics
appears at odds with the solutions they propose in
response to them. Indeed such proposals suggest that
once companies do comply with laws like the GDPR—
once the law has trained a spotlight on these companies’
inner workings—they may credibly claim to engage in
an “acceptable form” of surveillance capitalism: a
transparent and compliant version. Legalist-reform
responses concede the essential legitimacy of the legal
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frameworks that bind these companies, and in so doing
concede the essential legitimacy of the business models
that have developed within those frameworks. Under
this account, the problem is not whether such
technology—a platform optimized to exploit drivers, a
technology designed for at-scale personal surveillance—
should exist at all, but simply one of law’s absence in
ensuring its use is “up to code”. Once companies achieve
this standard of compliance, the problem is addressed.
Faith in a new regulatory regime to fill tech’s legal
lacuna can be misplaced, as companies actively work to
shape such regimes and use them to further their ends.
For instance, both critics and industry executives
expected companies like Facebook and Google to come
under harsh penalties and increased scrutiny for new
attempts at aggressive data extraction under the GDPR.
But enforcement has been largely absent, as underresourced European authorities struggle to build
complex investigations against wealthy international
companies (though defenders would rightly point out
that enforcement has picked up as of last year). More
troublingly, companies have used the GDPR’s consent
rules to re-introduce technologies previously banned in
the region[58]. In the U.S., state attempts to pass privacy
legislation have come under heavy scrutiny from
industry lobbyists; in Virginia, Amazon increased
political donations tenfold over four years before
successfully getting lawmakers to pass an industryfriendly privacy bill that Amazon itself drafted[59]. In
Washington, Amazon lobbyists negotiated to have
language inserted verbatim in the state’s pioneering
biometrics bill that meant the law, when it passed in 2017,
would have “little, if any, direct impact on Amazon’s
services”[59]. Companies do not just advance new
business-friendly regulatory regimes, but also shape
existing doctrines into shields from accountability,
distorting the doctrines of trade secrecy and commercial
speech protections to protect valuable data assets[24, 60].
Legal observers have long understood that injustice is
rarely a matter of law being absent. Instead, claims of
injustice often arise from the ways that existing law
structures patterns of exchange and establishes a
particular distribution of power among actors[61, 62].
Katharina Pistor provides a compelling example in her
account of the role law plays in facilitating contemporary
capitalism by encoding global capital using certain welltrodden legal properties[63]. Her account makes clear that
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global inequality does not arise due to the capacity of
assets and their owners to escape the law, but instead
through their ability to use the law (and, by extension, the
state) to distribute risk and reward in maximally
beneficial ways. In his history of global neoliberalism,
Quinn Slobodian further troubles the easy supposition
of law’s absence from the neoliberal justificatory
narrative. He shows how the policy package of
“privatization, deregulation, and liberalization”
associated with the neoliberal mode of governance was
at its core a project of legal institution building that
embraced, rather than shrank from, active re-working of
global projects of governance[64]. Britton-Purdy and
Grewal[65] provided a similar account of law’s active role
in furthering and bolstering a neoliberal form of marketstyle governance. Cohen’s[24] account of how law and
technology shape one another in the emergence of
informational capitalism similarly refutes the simple
account of law as a powerful yet regrettably absent tool
for disciplining the information economy. Instead, she
shows how the formation of informational capitalism
was as much a product of legal innovation as technical
innovation.
What these analyses make clear is that law is a terrain
of contestation for the regulatory arrangements that
structure any social process—including our technology
economy. Just as companies actively shape the ethics
response to enhance their interests and shield them from
accountability, so too does the daily business of
informational capitalism actively rely on specific
theories and forms of law. The problem is not law’s
absence from the technology industry, the digital
marketplace or platform, and informational capitalism.
The problem is precisely how existing law mediates the
institutions that it enacts, the productive activities it
encases, and the modes and myths of production it
upholds and legitimates.
3.2

Conceding law’s democratic legitimacy

The second (and perhaps more conceptually significant)
limitation of the lawfulness/legalist-reform response is
that it concedes the democratic legitimacy of law absent
any interrogation of why such legitimacy may or may not
be warranted, or under what conditions it may not hold.
Invoking law as a backstop against the harms of
technology relies on the premise that law enacts our
popular will regarding such harms. In other words, the
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lawfulness response implicitly or explicitly relies on the
view that law: (1) can express our democratic will, (2)
does express our democratic will, and therefore (3)
offers a legitimate democratic response to the popular
frustration of the techlash and social egalitarian claims
that arise from it. The legalist-reform response appeals
to law’s role as a moral floor on what we owe one another:
we may not trust technology companies, but we can trust
the laws to which they are beholden.
This tees up corporate interests to invoke the
lawfulness response as a way to trade on the authority
and legitimacy of law itself. Where law is proposed and
then invoked as moral cover, it serves to justify the
patterns of wealth accumulation or technological
development that law itself facilitates. Pistor notes that
“strategic and well-resourced actors” quietly push for
change outside the limelight of the public sphere; they
couple such efforts with “claims to the authority of law
to fend of critique and legitimize success”[66]. Indeed,
few claims to legitimacy are more powerful at present
than that something is “legal”[63].
Such normative appeals to law only warrant the
legitimacy they invoke insofar as the law itself is widely
accepted as a (sufficiently) legitimate expression of our
social code of conduct and thus a viable channel for
enforcing collective accountability. Yet a gap persists
between the moral standing the lawfulness response
means to invoke and the obligations its invocation in fact
incurs—law’s actual response to claims of injustice.
This gap complicates how one evaluates the political
purpose of the lawfulness response as well as the
political limitations of its legalist-reform corollary. As
a result, the lawfulness response (like the ethics response)
may also be anti-regulatory, albeit in a more complex
way.
To understand how this reliance on the legitimacy of
law may be in tension with the project of democratizing
technological progress, we need to turn from the techlash
to a parallel phenomenon: the growing legitimacy crisis
of law. The discipline of law itself is in foment over the
normative gap between (1) the political ideals that form
the basis of law’s legitimacy and (2) how the law actually
serves to bind and obligate agents to such ideals. This
poses a significant challenge to the normative and
political appeal of the lawfulness response. What does it
mean to address the crisis of legitimacy in tech with the
tools of law at a time when law is undergoing its own
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growing legitimacy crisis?

4

Law’s Legitimacy Crisis

In near parallel with the emergence of the techlash,
ferment is once again abroad in the law (to paraphrase
Llewellyn[2]). This ferment has engulfed a broad swathe
of legal regimes and institutions, but for the purposes of
illustration, a focus on the Supreme Court is instructive.
The Court is the paradigmatic institution of U.S. law. It
enjoys cultural significance as a stand-in for the legal
system more generally, and debates regarding the Court
can plausibly be read to reflect broader political
sentiment towards the legal system writ large. The Court
is not just a cultural talisman; due to the practice of (and
current standard for) judicial review, it has immense
importance for the substance of U.S. law: how lawyers
and regulators practice, interpret, and implement the law.
Many who once looked to the law as the primary
means by which progressive justice is advanced have
lost confidence that the Third Branch provides fruitful
terrain on which to champion progress[67, 68]. Though
still in its early days, this shift is noteworthy. The liberallegalist mythos of the Supreme Court and liberal Justices
as champions of progressive change has persisted for
decades. This is despite the general trend over the last 40odd years of the Court (and the justice system over which
it presides) prioritizing the constitutional rights of
corporate entities over human citizens[69, 70], eroding
protections erected against discrimination[71–74],
diminishing democratic governance at work and
restricting employee and consumer access to
recourse[75–78]. As recently as the spring of 2016, the
Supreme Court was widely celebrated for providing
progressive wins like Obergefell (2015)[79] and Whole
Women’s Health (2016)[80]. Liberal Justices, most
notably Ruth Bader Ginsburg, were fêted as icons of the
progressive movement, and many observed with
optimism the gradual leftward drift of Justice Kennedy,
the moderate swing-vote of the bench, on issues of free
speech and criminal justice reform[81]. Yet four years
later, the appointment of Brett Kavanaugh (despite the
testimony of Christine Blasey Ford and mass protests in
the wake of #MeToo) prompted popular liberal dismay
at the inability of the justice system to hold itself above,
let alone discipline, the political turmoil of our time.
Kavanaugh’s appointment marked, for many, a turning
point in coming to terms with the politics—conservative
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politics—of not just this Court, but the Court[82].
Of course, most reasonably sophisticated observers
have always acknowledged that politics play some role
in judicial reasoning and the workings of law. But the
explanatory power of this role tended (in the “correct”
account of both legal scholars and mainstream observers
of the long 1990s) to be downplayed. On this view, while
there is some partisan flavor to the judiciary, this has less
to do with vulgar partisanship and far more to do with
different theories of constitutional and statutory
interpretation among judges that happen to fall along
ideological boundaries③. On the whole, the prevailing
sense was—and in notable swathes of the legal academy,
still is—that there exists a meaningful “residual” in
judicial reasoning once ideological affinity has been
accounted for, a space that may be won through appeals
to reason and precedent. For liberal-legal political
reformers of the long 1990’s this “residual” comprised
a primary terrain of major progressive political
campaigns such as the fight for LGBTQ rights,
disabilities rights, and reproductive justice.
Yet in the span of a few years, political
ideology—while still far from a dominant view—has
become an ascendant explanans of judicial
decisionmaking, as presumptions of apolitical judicial
reasoning decline. On this account, the judiciary is not
above and immune from politics; instead, it plays an
active and willing role in conservative power
consolidation. Three recent developments strengthen
this alternative account. First, the mass appointment of
under-qualified (by the old standards of the elite bar)
partisan Trump appointees to the federal bench. Second,
the failure of liberal-legalist tactics to discipline the
excesses of Trump White House (e.g., the Mueller
investigation and the Impeachment proceedings). Third,
the willingness of the judiciary to play a deciding role in
hotly-contested and highly political issues[83].
This turning point in ideological understanding
coincides with the emergence of a community of legal
scholars interested in methodological interventions in
law. These aim to promote (1) a renewed sociological
turn in jurisprudence[84, 85], (2) a greater attentiveness to
the role law has played in facilitating inequality and
excessive private power, and (3) a renewed ideological
commitment to law’s role in addressing these challenges.
③ Living Constitutionalism being a progressive or liberal theory and
Originalism being prominent among the conservative judiciary.
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Loosely grouped under the banner of “Law and Political
Economy (LPE)”, this methodological agenda unsettles
the neat analytic separation between the economic
considerations in private law and the political
considerations in public law. LPE traces a
methodological lineage to Legal Realism, a tradition that
was itself closely allied with progressive aims. Like their
Legal Realist forebears, LPE scholars largely share a
commitment to social democratic or democratic socialist
political reform, expanding the terrain on which legal
reasoning and decision-making should be judged, and
incorporating a more complete accounting of law’s
social consequences and structuring capacities.
Similar to reformers responding to the techlash, these
legal reform projects aim to produce methodological
interventions and agendas to develop and advance
egalitarian and democratizing projects in legal
scholarship and legal pedagogy.
Progressive critique of the anti-democratic nature of
law is not new. The judicial branch has long been viewed
as anti-majoritarian and operating at a technocratic
remove from popular politics. Democrats as far back as
Bentham have attacked the undue power of courts,
recognizing the ideological power concealed in the
judicial power to decide “what the law is”[68, 86].
In the U.S., progressives once similarly viewed the
courts as the enemies of democracy. The American
tradition of using “judges as secret agents of political
transformation” has its roots in conservative, rather than
progressive, fears of the majority[67, 68, 86]. In 1885,
Englishman Sir Henry James Sumner Maine “sang the
praises of the U.S. Supreme Court, as one of the many
‘expedients’ in the U.S. Constitution that would allow
the ‘difficulties’ of any country ‘transforming itself’ into
a democracy to be ‘greatly mitigated’ or ‘altogether
overcome’”[86]. American conservatives of the era,
fearing the effects of mass suffrage, revived the thenobscure case Marbury v. Madison (1803)[87] to establish
the constitutionality of judicial review over
Congressional legislation (a reading of the case in
contrast to how it was interpreted in its own time), and
judges used this newfound power to invalidate
progressive legislation. It “took the strife of the Great
Depression, and fear of Franklin Roosevelt” to force the
Supreme Court into granting many of the most
significant pieces of legislation of that era, and which
form the basis of the modern U.S. state. While the
Progressives ultimately prevailed, FDR noted in 1937
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that victory came at a “terrible cost”[86].
This antagonistic history makes the more recent
progressive embrace of the Court all the more unusual.
These critiques, both long-standing and renewed, are not
for nothing. As the emerging crisis in law makes clear,
the progressive embrace of legalist strategies to secure
democratic agendas has produced meager results. The
Warren court (the high point of progressive power on the
Court) undoubtedly achieved victories for popular
justice. Yet it “is worth asking whether the courts were
necessary to the outcomes”—and whether it was worth
expanding the political prominence of an antidemocratic
power that “the right has now turned against
progressives”[86].
The most prominent progressive victories in the
court—de-segregation, voting rights, and legalizing
abortion—have all been subjects of sustained erosion.④
By achieving these political goals as legal wins, their
strength became subject to, and conditioned upon, the
interpretative methods of judicial review—a method that
in some sense marks the limits of these reforms. As the
liberal character of the court waned and these victories
have been reinterpreted ever more narrowly, the result
has been to enshrine formal protections of these legal
victories even as the functional social forms of injustice
they were meant to prevent gain new purchase.
To take school de-segregation as one prominent
example, more than sixty years after Brown v. Board of
Education (1954)[88], functional segregation thrives
even while being formally prohibited⑤. Despite this
landmark judicial victory, more than half of American
schoolchildren are in racially concentrated districts
where over 75 percent of students are either white or
nonwhite[89]. Even the districts most committed to
integration have experienced notable re-segregation
following successful court challenges from white
parents[90].
④ The 2015 decision upholding constitutional protection of gay
marriage undoubtedly ranks among the key progressive victories for the
Court. Unlike the other examples noted here, the constitutional and
statutory protections won in 2015 for members of the LGBTQ
community have simply not been enshrined in law long enough to endure
the sustained, decades-long legal attack that other progressive victories
face. It remains an open question therefore whether these protections will
face a similar fate of strong formal, negative protection, while the positive
conditions required to obtain and exercise such freedoms remain out of
reach for many.
⑤ It is worth noting that Brown is as much a legislative and democratic
victory as a judicial one. Though decided in 1954, school integration in
the South did not genuinely begin until a full ten years later, precisely
because it ultimately required federal legislative action to enforce.
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The courts’ dubious record presents a puzzle: should
the project of democratizing tech and reviving an
egalitarian spirit in law be to reclaim or reduce the power
of the legal system over the substantive conditions of
political wins and losses? If law is terrain on which the
struggles of the techlash must take place, is this terrain
we should seek to shield from the vicissitudes of political
life or to expose further to popular accountability, access,
and rule? Such questions go to the heart of longstanding
debates regarding the emancipatory potential of the legal
system and force us to contend with the limits of
articulating the demands of justice in the language of
courts, judges, and lawyers.

5

Democratizing Tech, Democratizing Law:
Rescuing What Law May Offer

Despite the shortcomings of the lawfulness response,
law will nevertheless play a key role in addressing the
harms of the techlash. Yet doing so in line with
egalitarian political aims will require re-invigorating the
possibility of law to channel and enact democratic will
rather than serving as a means for powerful interests to
circumvent that will.
As discussed above, the processes of wealth extraction
and social oppression at issue in the techlash exist by
virtue of their encasement in law. The lawfulness
response offers moral cover to continue engaging in
these practices; the legalist-reform response either
misdiagnoses these processes as occurring in the
absence of law or appeals to existing legal tools
incapable of addressing them. Instead, technology
reformers can recast the problems of the technology’s
failure as problems of law’s failure. Two clarifying
reformulations of the twin crises of law and technology
arise as a result.
First, this makes clear that both the crisis of law and the
crisis in technology are part of a larger egalitarian
political response to growing social inequality. Both
legal and technical institutions structure (and drive)
economic exchange, and thus serve to distribute power
and resources. Both also enforce and enact the
hierarchical relations that give shape to the social and
cultural experience of contemporary life. Thus, both
play a role in institutionalizing the current “justificatory
narrative” of “property, entrepreneurship, and
meritocracy” that informs how enduring inequalities are
justified[25]. As this justificatory narrative grows more
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fragile and contestable, so too, do the legal and technical
methods that encode and enact it. The role of both law
and technology in facilitating this narrative informs how
people evaluate our technology-based economy and our
legal system.
That inequality has grown should come as no
surprise—the hypercapitalist, neoliberal, or radical neopropertarian ideology that gained prominence during the
past several decades espouses the view that inequality is
a necessary byproduct of freer markets. Under this view,
inequality is required to produce a more efficient
allocation of goods and to increase overall productivity
(and thus overall wealth). Yet this has not turned out to
be the case. Socioeconomic inequality has increased in
all regions of the world since the 1980s and identitarian
violence has accompanied the faith in market action and
efficient allocation[25]. Inequality has had particularly
pernicious effects in the US. While the top decile’s share
of income (not wealth, where differences are even more
pronounced) has risen almost everywhere, in the US it
rose from 35% to 48% of total national income. This
increase for those at the top “has come at the expense of
the bottom 50 percent” of the population, which as of
2018, commanded only 10% of the total national
income[25] (emphasis my own).
In response to increasing inequality and its harmful
social and political effects, reformers of law and
technology share a broad methodological commitment
to expanding the epistemic capacity of technical or legal
methods to recognize and act on inequality and a broad
political agenda of reforming technology or law to
further social justice goals. Both express the growing
democratic and egalitarian response to the challenges of
rising inequality and social oppression.
Second, and perhaps of more importance for any
positive legal and political agenda, we may reformulate
the crisis of techlash as, at least in part, a crisis of the
failure of law. Many of the tech’s democracy problems
may be reinterpreted as instances of law’s democracy
problem. Law has been instrumental in creating the
social challenges of the techlash, and law, as a terrain
upon which to create, enact, and enforce democratic
reform, will be instrumental in addressing those
challenges.
Both popularly and intellectually, the legal system’s
case for its own democratic legitimacy is increasingly
thin. If the primary interests served by the law are those
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of the powerful against the powerless, how does such a
legal system continue to justify itself in a democratic
society, particularly in light of growing public
egalitarian challenges against the failures of the status
quo? If the legal system systematically cannot serve to
correct for problems of inequality, unfairness, and
oppression, or even provide basic recourse to make one’s
case against such social effects, then what, precisely, is
it for?
Critiques of law as inherently anti-democratic suggest
that one priority may be reducing the prominence of
existing law (and the courts that uphold it) as the primary
terrain on which we pursue the democratization of
technology production, and focus instead on political
battles to remake the law governing technology
production. Yet even in its reduced role, law remains a
primary means by which democratic will is expressed
and enforced. The legal system is failing to provide its
most basic function: to provide recourse and
enforcement of our popular expression of justice through
law. Its capacity to do so has been eroded over time and
across core functions of law in ways that have, if not
caused, then certainly exacerbated the crisis of
democratic legitimacy in tech.
Another pathway is to embrace the terrain of law as
essential to the project of democratizing technology
production. This strategy, too, has a notable progressive
tradition. Reflecting on E. P. Thompson’s understanding
of law’s role in traditions of radical dissent, Gordon[62]
notes that the Marxist historian was well aware of law’s
instrumental function as “a bag of weapons and tricks for
the rich and powerful to use against the poor”, but he
“never succumbed to a crudely instrumental view of
law”. Instead, he understood law to be a “crucial element
in the constitution of markets and relations of power and
of production” that has the capacity to enact many
different social roles and relations and is thus important
terrain for radical dissent.
On this view, enacting meaningful legal institutions to
discipline technology will require a democratic
reinvigoration of law’s capacity to express and enact
popular democratic strength of will. Willy Forbath offers
one robust positive vision of democratizing legal reform
in form of constitutional political economy, developing
a theory of constitutional law that does not ask what
forms of redistribution the law permits, but instead what
forms of redistribution the law requires: grounding
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political claims to the social and material conditions of
freedom as necessary conditions for equal citizenship.
These in turn produce a series of affirmative duties to
secure these conditions against oligarchy[91]. Others
disagree on whether a positive democratizing legal
agenda needs to extend to constitutionalism, or focus
instead on diminishing the power of constitutional
constraints over popular legislation[92]. Yet both views
hold that democratizing law will require departing from
the predominant mode of reinterpreting law in antidemocratic courts in favor of remaking law in popular
legislative political wins. These wins may occur at the
local, state, or national level, take the form of new law
(such as facial recognition bans or surveillance
ordinances) or renewed law (such as revivals of FTC
unfairness enforcement or substantive standards of
merger review).
Waldron[93] notes that “a lot of what makes law
worthwhile, … is that it commits us to a certain method
of arguing about the exercise of public power”. Situating
the problems of techlash on legal terrain gives us
recourse to this method, both to contend with the
problems of the digital economy and to develop the
democratic legal institutions in respond to them.
Properly attending to the techlash and the lawfulness
response will require re-politicizing “critical questions
of self-governance” that have been lost as we cede
democratic control of law in ways that facilitated
mobility for some at the expense of the rest[66]. In other
words, what we need is not technology that is more
ethical, humane, or lawful. Instead, we must make our
social institutions—including those of law and our techbased economy—more democratic.
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